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Accrual-Based and Real Earnings Management Activities 
around Seasoned Equity Offerings 
 
Abstract 
We examine earnings management behavior around SEOs, focusing on both real 
activities and accrual-based manipulation, and how this behavior varies over time and 
cross-sectionally. Although research has addressed the issues of earnings management 
around SEOs and earnings management via real activities manipulation, ours is the first 
paper to put these two issues together. We make three contributions to the literature. 
First, we document that firms use real, as well as accrual-based, earnings management 
tools around SEOs. Second, consistent with the expectation that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) has made accrual-based earnings management more costly, we find that firms 
have substituted from accrual to real earnings management after SOX. Finally, we show 
how the tendency for firms to tradeoff real versus accrual-based earnings management 
activities around SEO’s varies cross-sectionally. We find that firms’ choices vary 
predictably as a function of the firm’s ability to use accrual management and the costs of 
doing so. Our model is a first step in examining how firms tradeoff between real versus 
accrual methods of earnings management.  
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we examine both real and accrual-based earnings management 
activities around seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). While a number of papers have 
documented evidence in support of income-increasing earnings management activities 
around SEOs (e.g., Rangan 1998, Teoh et al. 1998, Shivakumar 2000, and DuCharme et 
al. 2000) they have studied accrual-based manipulation exclusively. Such accruals-based 
earnings management activities have no direct cash flows consequences. Our research 
objective is important, since firms might use multiple strategies to manage their reported 
earnings around SEOs, for example, through real activities manipulations that does affect 
cash flows. We refer to real activities manipulation as actions managers take that deviate 
from normal business practices.1 
Recently, there has been an increased appreciation for understanding and 
documenting how firms manage earnings thru real activities manipulation in addition to 
accrual-based activities (e.g., Gunny 2006, Roychowdhury 2006, and Zang 2006). For 
example, Roychowdhury (2006) finds evidence that firms use multiple real earnings 
management tools in order to meet certain financial reporting benchmarks to avoid 
reporting annual losses. In particular, his evidence suggests that managers are providing 
price discounts to temporarily boost sales, reducing discretionary expenditures in order to 
improve reported margins, and overproducing to lower the cost of goods sold. 
In a recent survey of top executives, Graham et al. (2005) provide evidence 
suggesting that managers prefer real earnings management activities compared to 
                                                 
1 This definition is consistent with Roychowdhury (2006) who defines real activities manipulations as: 
“…management actions that deviate from normal business practices, undertaken with the primary objective 
of meeting certain earnings thresholds.” 
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accrual-based earnings management. This is the case since real management activities 
can be indistinguishable from optimal business decisions, and thus more difficult to 
detect, although the costs involved in such activities can be economically significant to 
the firm. Moreover, consistent with the conjectures made by Graham et al. (2005), Cohen 
et al. (2007) find that mangers have shifted away from accrual to real earnings 
management in the post Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) period. This evidence implies that in 
the post-SOX period that followed highly publicized accounting scandals, the need to 
avoid detection of accrual-based earnings management is greater than in previous periods 
inducing managers to shift from accrual-based to real earnings management activities. 
Despite the increasing interest in and importance of real earnings management 
activities, no study to date has examined whether and how firms engage in real earnings 
management around SEOs, and how real and accrual-based earnings management 
interact around these important corporate events. We fill this gap in the literature. 
To capture accrual-based earnings management we use the modified cross-
sectional Jones model (Jones 1991) as described in Dechow et al. (1995). To capture real 
earnings management, we follow Roychowdhury (2006) and estimate abnormal levels of 
cash flows from operations, discretionary expenses (advertising, R&D, and SG&A), and 
production costs. In addition, we combine these three measures into a comprehensive 
aggregate measure of real earnings management.   
Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Teoh et al. 1998, Rangan 1998, among others) 
we find that firms use accrual-based earnings management around SEOs. In addition, also 
consistent with previous research, we find that SEO firms tend to both outperform their 
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industry peers in the period preceding the SEO and underperform their peers following 
the SEO, as evidenced by their returns on assets (ROA).  
We make three contributions to the literature. First, consistent with the evidence 
in Zhang (2006) that firms use multiple earnings management tools, we document that 
firms use real, as well as accrual-based, earnings management activities around SEOs. 
Second, we show how firms’ use of real versus accrual earnings management around 
SEOs has varied inter-temporally, by comparing the relative amounts of each type before 
and after the passage of the recent SOX regulation. Consistent with the expectation that 
SOX has made accrual earnings management more costly, we find a shift from accrual-
based to real earnings management after SOX.  
Finally, we show how the tendency for firms to tradeoff real versus accrual 
earnings management around SEOs varies cross-sectionally. We estimate a two-stage 
model using the Heckman (1979) method to control for firms’ self-selection to manage 
reported earnings. In the first stage, we estimate a parsimonious selection model to 
explain firms’ overall decisions to engage in earnings management or not. Next, 
conditional on this first stage analysis, in the second stage we analyze the factors 
determining the preference for real earnings management strategies as compared to 
accruals based ones. 
We empirically model a firm’s choice to use real and/or accrual earnings 
management tools around SEOs as a function of its ability to use accrual management 
and the costs of doing so. We represent a firm’s ability to manage earnings through 
accruals by its net operating assets (NOA) position (following Barton and Simko 2002), 
and the costs of such behavior proxied by its auditor characteristics, analyst following, 
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and litigation probability. We find that firms’ choices vary predictably with these factors. 
Although we use our model to study SEOs, we emphasize that the model could be used 
more generally to study how firms tradeoff between the two methods of earnings 
management, an important topic for future research.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related literatures 
on earnings management around SEOs, real earnings management, and the effect of SOX 
on earnings management. Section 3 discusses our empirical methodology, including our 
sample construction and estimation equations. Section 4 discusses our empirical results. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Related Literature and Research Objectives 
Our paper unites two streams of research that have previously been disparate, one 
on real earnings management and the other on earnings management around SEOs.2 We 
first discuss related research, and then we build on the existing body of evidence to state 
our research objectives.  
 
2.1 Accrual-based Earnings Management around SEOs 
Beginning with Rangan (1998) and Teoh et al. (1998), researchers have been 
concerned with whether firms manage reported earnings during SEOs, and the accounting 
and stock market consequences associated with such activities. This literature has been 
motivated by the empirical findings that SEOs are followed by both poor stock returns 
                                                 
2 Earnings management around SEOs is really part of a larger literature studying earnings management 
around corporate events such as IPOs, management buyouts, stock repurchases, and stock for stock 
acquisitions.  
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and poor earnings performance, leading researchers to suspect that earnings have been 
managed upward in anticipation of the SEO, and subsequently reverse (e.g., Teoh et al. 
1998, Rangan 1998, and Shivakumar 2000). 
Rangan (1998) finds positive abnormal accruals (i.e., upwardly managed reported 
earnings) on average for SEO firms during the year around the SEO, and that these 
accruals predict both earnings reversals and poor stock performance in the following 
year. He interprets his findings to mean that firms manage earnings upward around SEOs, 
and that the stock market is mislead by the upwardly managed earnings, temporarily 
overvaluing issuing firms and then being disappointed by their predictable earnings 
declines, which cause their stock prices to subsequently fall. Teoh et al. (1998) report 
similar evidence to Rangan, with the additional finding that SEO issuers who upwardly 
manage earnings more (greater positive abnormal accruals) have lower post-event stock 
returns and subsequent earnings. Their interpretation is the same as the one offered by 
Rangan (1998). 
Shivakumar (2000) also finds evidence consistent with accruals earnings 
management around SEOs, but in contrast to Rangan and Teoh et al., he shows that the 
stock market does not react inefficiently to the upwardly managed earnings, but that 
investors rationally undo these effects. He attributes Rangan’s and Teoh et al.’s findings 
of abnormal stock returns to test misspecification, arguing that the earnings management 
is not designed to fool or mislead investors, but is itself a rational response to the 
market’s anticipation that firms will upwardly manage earnings around the SEO. 
DuCharme et al. (2004) add a legal dimension to the research on SEOs. They 
show that abnormal accruals are highest for SEOs that are subsequently sued, and 
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settlement amounts are also positively related to the levels of abnormal accruals. 
Likewise, post-SEO earnings reversals are more pronounced and post-SEO stock returns 
are lower for litigated SEOs. They interpret their results as indicating that the earnings 
manipulation drives the post-SEO litigation. Collectively, these papers find strong 
evidence of accruals earnings management around SEOs, and link the earnings 
management activities to post event litigation. There is disagreement, however, as to 
whether the stock market is indeed misled by the earnings management activities around 
SEOs. 
 
2.2 Real Earnings Management 
Although real earnings management has not been as widely studied as accrual-
based earnings management, Graham et al.’s (2005) survey finds that managers prefer 
real activities manipulation, by such means as reducing discretionary expenditures or 
capital investments, over accruals manipulation as a way to manage earnings. These real 
earnings management activities are significantly different than accrual-based ones as they 
have direct cash flows effects. Graham et al. (2005, p. 32) find 
.....strong evidence that managers take real economic actions to maintain 
accounting appearances. In particular, 80% of survey participants report 
that they would decrease discretionary spending on R&D, advertising, 
and maintenance to meet an earnings target. More than half (55.3%) state 
that they would delay starting a new project to meet an earnings target, 
even if such a delay entailed a small sacrifice in value. . . .  
 
There are at least two reasons for executives’ greater willingness to manage 
earnings through real activities than through accruals. First, accrual-based earnings 
management is more likely to draw auditor or regulatory scrutiny than real decisions, 
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such as those related to product pricing, production, and expenditures on research and 
development or advertising. Second, relying on accrual manipulation alone is risky. The 
realized shortfall between unmanaged earnings and the desired threshold can exceed the 
amount by which it is possible to manipulate accruals after the end of the fiscal period. If 
reported income falls below the threshold and all accrual-based strategies to meet it are 
exhausted, managers are left with no options because real activities cannot be adjusted at 
or after the end of the fiscal reporting period. 
Consistent with these predictions, researchers have documented variations in 
R&D expenditures and asset sales linked to firms meeting and/or beating earnings 
benchmarks. For example, Bartov (1993) finds that firms with negative earnings changes 
report higher profits from asset sales, suggesting that the profits are used to blunt the bad 
earnings news. Dechow and Sloan (1991) find that executives near the end of their tenure 
reduce R&D expenditures to increase short-term earnings. In related studies, Baber et al. 
(1991) and Bushee (1998) report evidence consistent with firms reducing R&D 
expenditures to meet earnings benchmarks such as positive earnings or positive earnings 
changes. 
Recently, three related studies examine real earnings management activities and 
their capital market consequences. Roychowdhury (2006) focuses on real activities 
manipulations, which he defines as management actions that deviate from normal 
business practices, undertaken with the primary objective to mislead certain stakeholders 
into believing that earnings benchmarks have been met in the normal course of 
operations. Focusing on the zero earnings threshold and examining annual data, he finds 
evidence consistent with firms trying to avoid reporting losses in three ways: (1) boosting 
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sales through accelerating their timing and/or generating additional unsustainable sales 
through increased price discounts or more lenient credit terms; (2) overproducing and 
thereby allocating more overhead to inventory and less to cost of goods sold, which leads 
to lower cost of goods sold and increased operating margins; or (3) aggressively reducing 
aggregate discretionary expenses (defined as the sum of research and development, 
advertising, and SG&A expenses) to improve margins. This is most likely to occur when 
such discretionary expenses do not generate immediate revenues and income. 
Zang (2006) analyzes the tradeoffs between accrual manipulations and real 
earnings management. She suggests that decisions to manage earnings through “real” 
actions precede decisions to manage earnings through accruals. Her results show that real 
manipulation is positively correlated with the costs of accrual manipulation, and that 
accrual and real manipulations are negatively correlated. These findings lead her to 
conclude that managers treat the two strategies as substitutes. 
In related research, Gunny (2005) examines the consequences of real earnings 
management and finds that real earnings management has a significant negative impact 
on future operating performance. Additionally, it appears that capital markets participants 
mostly recognize the future earnings implications of managers’ myopic behaviors.  
 
2.3 Real Earnings Management in the Post-SOX period 
Recent research has focused on evaluating and understanding the economic 
consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), arguably “the most far-reaching reforms 
of American business practices since the time of Franklin D. Roosevelt.”3 One of the 
                                                 
3 Elizabeth Bumiller, “Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations,” New York Times, July 31, 2002. 
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interesting issues that have been addressed in the literature is whether earnings 
management overall and the mix of strategies (i.e., accrual-based versus real activities) 
have changed significantly in the post-SOX period. In particular, as Graham, et al. (2005, 
p.36) conjecture:  
. . . the aftermath of accounting scandals at Enron and WorldCom and the 
certification requirements imposed by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act may have 
changed managers’ preferences for the mix between taking accounting 
versus real actions to manage earnings. 
 
Analyzing trends in earnings management practices in the pre- and post-SOX 
periods, Cohen et al. (2007) find that firms switched from accrual-based to real earnings 
management methods after the passage of SOX. They report that firms that just achieved 
important earnings benchmarks used fewer accruals and more real earnings management 
strategies after SOX when compared to similar firms before SOX.  
 The apparent change in managerial behavior with respect to the alternative 
strategies employed to manage reported earnings after SOX motivates us to examine 
whether any such change can be observed for firms that are engaging in seasoned equity 
offerings. Specifically, we seek to understand whether firms engaging in SEOs in the 
post-SOX period use different earnings management tools as compared to the pre-SOX 
period. The SOX regulation is a natural setting to perform this type of an experiment, as 
it is regarded as an exogenous shock affecting all the firms in the US economy. 
In summary, there is strong evidence of real earnings management activities, 
achieved via multiple means, and it is likely linked to meeting certain earnings 
benchmarks. Building on the above, we first seek to examine whether real earnings 
management activities are used as earnings management tools around SEOs and whether 
there exists any substitution or complementary relation with accrual-based strategies. In 
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line with the literature to date, we also examine the subsequent performance following 
SEOs as a function of the earnings management vehicle used around the year of the SEO. 
Our second objective is to investigate whether SEO firms’ choice of earnings 
management tools has changed from the pre-SOX to the post-SOX period. Finally, we 
examine the cross-sectional determinants of the choices firms make among different 
earnings management activities around SEOs, to better understand why certain firms will 
choose different earnings management tools around the year of the SEO. 
  Next, we discuss the empirical methodology we employ to address our research 
objectives. 
 
3. Empirical Methodology       
3.1 Data and Sample Description 
Our SEO sample consists of 1,511 completed U.S. offers over the 1987 to 2006 
period, and is obtained from the Securities Data Company (SDC) New Issue database. 
The sample criteria requires SEOs to be issues of common stocks by U.S. issuers which 
are listed on NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX and exclude the following: (1) SEOs lacking 
COMPUSTAT annual financial statement data for the 4 years prior to the SEO filing 
date, the offer year and the subsequent year, (2) completed SEOs with offer prices less 
than $5 and withdrawn SEOs with filing range midpoint less than $5, (3) spin-offs, (4) 
reverse LBOs, (5) closed-end fund, unit investment trusts, REITS and limited 
partnerships, (6) rights and standby issues, (7) simultaneous or combined offers of several 
classes of securities such as unit offers of stocks and warrants and, (8) non-domestic and 
simultaneous domestic-international offers. 
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We collect our financial data from the COMPUSTAT annual industrial and research 
files for the sample period.  We restrict our sample to all nonfinancial firms with 
available data, and require at least 8 observations in each 2-digit SIC grouping per year.  
Further, we require that each firm-year observation has the data necessary to calculate the 
discretionary accruals metrics and real earnings management proxies we employ in our 
analysis.  This restriction (which we share with other papers on SEOs) likely introduces a 
survivorship bias into the sample resulting in the inclusion of larger and more successful 
firms.  We expect that this will reduce the variation in our earnings management metrics 
resulting in a more conservative test of our research questions.   
Following Collins and Hribar (2002), we use cash flows from operations obtained 
from the Statement of Cash Flows reported under the Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 95 (SFAS No. 95, FASB 1987).4  The sample period of 1987-2006 permits 
us to use SFAS No. 95 statement of cash flow data to estimate accruals, rather than a 
balance sheet approach.  
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of our SEO sample. Panel A provides summary 
information on the size and offering characteristics. Consistent with previous studies 
(e.g., Teoh et al. 1998, Rangan, 1998), our sample of SEO firms tends to have high book-
to-market ratios, averaging around 2.5. This is not surprising, since firms tend to issue 
equity when valuations are high. Average offer size is about ¼ of pre-offer market value.  
Panel B shows the distribution of SEOs over time. Also, consistent with previous 
research, there is some time clustering, as many SEOs occurred during the 1990’s. For 
example, during 1991-1999, there were 879 out our total sample of 1,511 SEOs (58%).  
                                                 
4 SFAS No. 95 requires firms to present a statement of cash flows for fiscal years ending after July 15, 
1988. Some firms early-adopted SFAS No. 95, so our sample begins in 1987. 
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This is also not surprising, since the stock market boomed during this period, and equity 
valuations were high. Since the market experienced a significant downturn beginning in 
2000, there have been fewer SEOs.  
Panel C reports the frequency of SEOs by industry and indicates that while SEOs 
occur in many different types of businesses, during our sample period they were 
especially frequent in high technology areas as chemical products, computer equipment, 
electronic equipment, and electronic services. Together, these four industries comprise 
more than 40% of the sample Again, this finding is not surprising, as the high tech fields 
led the 1990s stock market boom. In summary, our sample exhibits similar characteristics 
to samples in previous SEO research, indicating that SEOs are clustered both in time and 
by industries. 
 
3.2 Earnings Management Metrics 
Accrual-based Earnings Management 
We use a cross-sectional model of discretionary accruals, where for each year we 
estimate the model for every industry classified by its 2-digit SIC code.  Thus, our 
approach partially controls for industry-wide changes in economic conditions that affect 
total accruals while allowing the coefficients to vary across time (Kasznik, 1999; DeFond 
and Jiambalvo, 1994).5 
Our primary model is the modified cross-sectional Jones model (Jones 1991) as 
described in Dechow et al. (1995).  The modified Jones model is estimated for each 2 
digit SIC-year grouping as follows: 
                                                 
5 We obtain qualitatively the same results when we use a time-series approach which assumes temporal 
stationarity of the parameters for each firm. 
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where, for fiscal year t and firm i, TA represents total accruals defined as:  
TA it = EBXI it – CFO it, where EBXI is the earnings before extraordinary items 
and discontinued operations (annual Compustat data item 123) and CFO is the operating 
cash flows (from continuing operations) taken from the statement of cash flows (annual 
Compustat data item 308 – annual Compustat data item 124), Assetit-1 represents total 
assets (annual Compustat data item 6), ΔREVit is the change in revenues (annual 
Compustat data item 12) from the preceding year and PPEit is the gross value of property, 
plant and equipment (annual Compustat data item 7).  
The coefficient estimates from equation (1) are used to estimate the firm-specific 
normal accruals (NA it) for our sample firms: 
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where ΔARit is the change in accounts receivable (annual Compustat data item 2) from 
the preceding year.  Following the methodology used in the literature, we estimate the 
industry-specific regressions using the change in reported revenues, implicitly assuming 
no discretionary choices with respect to revenue recognition.  However, while computing 
the normal accruals, we adjust the reported revenues of the sample firms for the change in 
accounts receivable to capture any potential accounting discretion arising from credit 
sales. Our measure of discretionary accruals is the difference between total accruals and 
the fitted normal accruals, defined as DAit = (TA it / Assetit-1) – NA it.  
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In our robustness tests, we used two alternative measures of discretionary accruals. In 
one alternative measure we estimated the following in the first stage:  
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Using the coefficient estimates obtained from (3), we calculated the level of normal 
accruals (NAit) as a percent of lagged total assets. We also repeat our tests by using a 
measure based on the performance-matched discretionary accruals advanced in Kothari 
Leone, and Wasley (2005).  As suggested by Kothari et al. (2005), we match each firm-
year observation with another from the same two-digit SIC code and year with the closest 
return on assets in the current year, ROAit (net income divided by total assets).6  Based on 
the previous papers on SEOs and accrual earnings management cited above, we predict 
that our sample will have positive abnormal accruals around the SEO event.  
 
Real Earnings Management 
We rely on prior studies to develop our proxies for real earnings management. As 
in Roychowdhury (2006), we consider three metrics: the abnormal levels of cash flow 
from operations (CFO), discretionary expenses, and production costs to study the level of 
real activities manipulations. Subsequent studies, such as Zang (2006) and Gunny (2006), 
provide evidence of the construct validity of these proxies. We focus on three 
manipulation methods and their impact on the above three variables: 
                                                 
6We also carry out performance matching based on two-digit SIC code, year and ROA (both current ROA 
and lagged ROA) and obtain results similar to those reported in the paper. Our results using these alternate 
measures of accruals are consistent with those reported in the paper.  
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1. Acceleration of the timing of sales through increased price discounts or 
more lenient credit terms. Such discounts and lenient credit terms will 
temporarily increase sales volumes, but these are likely to disappear once 
the firm reverts to old prices. The additional sales will boost current period 
earnings, assuming the margins are positive. However, both price 
discounts and more lenient credit terms will result in lower cash flows in 
the current period.  
2. Reporting of lower cost of goods sold through increased production. 
Managers can increase production more than necessary in order to 
increase earnings. When managers produce more units, they can spread 
the fixed overhead costs over a larger number of units, thus lowering fixed 
costs per unit. As long as the reduction in fixed costs per unit is not offset 
by any increase in marginal cost per unit, total cost per unit declines. This 
decreases reported COGS and the firm can report higher operating 
margins. However, the firm will still incur other production and holding 
costs that will lead to higher annual production costs relative to sales, and 
lower cash flows from operations given sales levels. 
3. Decreases in discretionary expenses which include advertising expense, 
research and development, and SG&A expenses. Reducing such expenses 
will boost current period earnings. It could also lead to higher current 
period cash flows (at the risk of lower future cash flows) if the firm 
generally paid for such expenses in cash.  
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We first generate the normal levels of CFO, discretionary expenses and 
production costs using the model developed by Dechow, Kothari and Watts (1998) as 
implemented in Roychowdhury (2006). We express normal CFO as a linear function of 
sales and change in sales. To estimate this model, we run the following cross-sectional 
regression for each industry and year: 
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Abnormal CFO is actual CFO minus the normal level of CFO calculated using the 
estimated coefficients from (4).  
 Production costs are defined as the sum of cost of goods sold (COGS) and 
change in inventory during the year. We model COGS as a linear function of 
contemporaneous sales: 
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Next, we model inventory growth as a linear function of the contemporaneous and 
lagged change in sales: 
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Using (5) and (6), we estimate the normal level of production costs as: 
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The normal level of discretionary expenses can be expressed as a linear function 
of sales: 
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Modeling discretionary expenses as a function of current sales creates a 
mechanical problem if firms manage sales upwards to increase reported earnings in a 
certain year, resulting in significantly lower residuals from running a regression as 
specified in (8). To address this issue, we model discretionary expenses as a function of 
lagged sales and estimate the following model to derive ‘normal’ levels of discretionary 
expenses: 
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 In the above equations CFO is cash flow from operations in period t (Compustat data 
item 308 – annual Compustat data item 124); Prod represents the production costs in 
period t, defined as the sum of COGS (annual Compustat data item 41) and the change in 
inventories (annual Compustat data item 3); DiscExp represents the discretionary 
expenditures in period t, defined as the sum of advertising expenses (annual Compustat 
data item 45), R&D expenses (annual Compustat data item 46)7 and SG&A (annual 
Compustat data item 189).  The abnormal CFO (R_CFO), abnormal production costs 
(R_PROD) and abnormal discretionary expenses (R_DISX) are computed as the 
difference between the actual values and the normal levels predicted from equations (4) 
(7) and (9). We use these three variables as proxies for real earnings management. Given 
sales levels, firms that manage earnings upwards are likely to have one or all of these: 
unusually low cash flow from operations, and/or unusually low discretionary expenses, 
and/or unusually high production costs.  
                                                 
7 As long as SG&A is available, advertising expenses and R&D are set to zero if they are missing. 
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In order to capture the effects of real earnings management through all these three 
variables in a comprehensive measure, we compute a single variable by combining the 
three individual real earnings management variables.  Specifically, consistent with Zang 
(2006), we multiply R_CFO and R_DISX by negative one so the higher the amount of 
R_CFO and R_DISX, the more likely it is that the firm is engaging in sales manipulations 
through price discounts and cutting discretionary expenses. We do not multiply R_PROD 
by negative one since higher production costs, as noted earlier, is indicative of 
overproduction to reduce cost of goods sold. Our combined measure, RM_PROXY is the 
sum of the above standardized variables, R_CFO, R_PROD and R_DISX. However, we 
acknowledge that the three individual variables underlying RM_PROXY have different 
implications for earnings which may dilute any results using RM_PROXY alone. We thus 
report results corresponding to the single real earnings management proxy (RM_PROXY) 
as well as the three individual real earnings management proxies (R_CFO, R_PROD and 
R_DISX).  
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Overall Sample 
Table 2 presents median discretionary accruals, abnormal cash flows from 
operations, abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary expenditures, all 
scaled by beginning of the period total assets, for years -3 to +3 relative to the year of the 
SEO. We report medians as they are less likely to be influenced by extreme observations.  
Consistent with Rangan (1998), Teoh et al. (1998), Shivakumar (2000), and 
DuCharme et al (2004), we find significant positive abnormal accruals in the year of the 
 20
SEO.  Thus, our sample exhibits the same earnings enhancing accruals management as 
previous papers.  
Most important, we find significant positive abnormal production costs, negative 
abnormal discretionary expenses, and (negative) abnormal CFO in the SEO year, as 
predicted. This is the first evidence of real earnings management around SEOs.  
Interestingly, we find some evidence of negative abnormal production costs and 
positive abnormal discretionary expenses in the years immediately preceding and 
immediately following the SEO, although the magnitudes are smaller than in the SEO 
year, and not necessarily significant. The direction, however, is opposite to what occurs 
in the SEO year, and suggests that management may adjust production and expenditures 
in anticipation of, and in response to, the SEO so that over the “long run” abnormal real 
behavior is minimized. 
Table 3 reports the correlations between the various proxies of earnings 
management in the year of the SEO. The correlation between discretionary accruals and 
abnormal cash flow from operations is significantly negative (-25%, Pearson and -23%, 
Spearman). This correlation can be explained by (a) firms engaging in accrual-based 
earnings management and real activities manipulations at the same time, and (b) some 
manipulation strategies, for instance overproduction, have a positive effect on 
discretionary accruals and at the same time a negative effect on abnormal cash flows 
from operations. Consistent with the above interpretation, the correlation coefficient 
between discretionary accruals and abnormal production costs is significantly positive 
(3% Pearson and Spearman) whereas the correlation coefficient between discretionary 
accruals and discretionary expenses is significantly negative (-18%, Pearson and -15% 
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Spearman). Analyzing the correlations among the real activities proxies reveals that the 
correlation coefficient between abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary 
expenses is significantly negative (-28%, Pearson and -20% Spearman). This implies that 
managers are engaging in activities which lead to abnormally high production costs at the 
same time that they are reducing discretionary expenses while the overall objective is to 
report as high as possible earnings for the period. The negative correlation between 
abnormal production costs and abnormal cash flows from operations (-28%, Pearson and 
-19% Spearman) is consistent with the observation that overproduction has a negative 
effect on contemporaneous abnormal cash flows from operations.  
For comparison purposes with previous SEO studies cited above, Table 4 reports 
the median return on assets (ROA) in the SEO year and the years immediately preceding 
and following it, where ROA is defined as income before extraordinary items divided by 
beginning of period total assets. Recall that these studies found positive abnormal 
performance in the SEO year, followed by negative abnormal performance in the 
subsequent year(s), which they interpret as evidence of upward earnings management 
followed by a predictable reversal.8 We find similar performance over time, with the 
reversal occurring over at least 2-3 years after the event, for both our overall sample 
(Panel A), and for various subsamples (Panels B thru F).  
In summary, we document that firms use both accrual and real earnings 
management around SEOs, leading to positive abnormal performance in the SEO year 
and (perhaps inevitable) subsequent reversal. Our results are the first evidence to date of 
                                                 
8An alternative interpretation of this evidence is that firms choose to issue SEOs when they have been 
successful, and their subsequent performance decline is due to a natural regression to the mean (Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2007). 
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real earnings management activities around SEOs. We now turn to examining how firms’ 
earnings management behavior around SEOs has changed in response to the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002. 
 
4.2 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
Following our discussion in section 2.3, the apparent change in managerial 
behavior with respect to the alternative strategies employed to manage reported earnings 
after SOX motivates us to examine whether any such change can be observed for firms 
that are engaging in seasoned equity offerings. Specifically, we compare discretionary 
accruals, abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary expenditures, abnormal CFO 
and our overall R_M Proxy measure in the pre-SOX period and subsequently in the post-
SOX period. If SOX induced a switch away from accrual-based earnings management 
towards real earnings management as recent evidence suggests (e.g., Cohen et al. 2007), 
we expect to see a reduction in discretionary accruals, increases in abnormal production 
costs, decreases in discretionary expenditures and an overall increase in R_M Proxy from 
the pre-SOX to the post-SOX period, for our SEO sample. One should note that price 
discounts, channel stuffing, and overproduction have a negative effect on 
contemporaneous abnormal CFO, while reduction of discretionary expenditures has a 
positive effect. Thus, the net effect on abnormal CFO is ambiguous. The results are 
reported in Table 5.  
The directions of the observed changes from the pre-SOX to post-SOX periods 
are consistent with our predictions, and three are highly statistically significant. Row 1 
shows that while SEO firms still exhibit positive discretionary accruals after SOX, the 
average magnitude is reduced by almost 3/4th’s, and the change is highly statistically 
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significant (t statistic =-8.54). Similarly, both abnormal CFO and abnormal production 
costs have increased significantly, with t-statistics of 4.19 and 3.95, respectively. Only 
the change in abnormal discretionary expenses is insignificant, but it is nevertheless 
negative, as expected. Thus, table shows that while SEO firms still use both types of 
earnings management in the post-SOX period, they have substituted away from accrual-
based earnings management and towards real earnings management. We now investigate 
factors that determine why SEO firms use accrual versus real earnings management in the 
year of the SEO. 
 
4.3 Cross-sectional Determinants of Earnings Management Strategies for SEO Firms 
Table 2 showed that SEO firms have both abnormal accruals and abnormal real 
activities. Table 3 showed that the correlation between SEO firms’ discretionary accruals 
and abnormal cash flow from operations is significantly negative. Together, we interpret 
these results as evidence that SEO firms tend to engage in both accrual and real earnings 
management activities, and they substitute between the two methods, consistent with 
Zang (2006). We now investigate the factors that influence their decisions to manage 
earnings, and if so, which method to use. To do so, we estimate a two-stage model using 
the Heckman (1979) method to control for firms’ self-selection to manage reported 
earnings. In the first stage, we estimate a parsimonious selection model to explain firms’ 
overall decisions to engage in earnings management or not. Next, conditional on this first 
stage analysis, in the second stage we analyze the factors determining the preference for 
real earnings management strategies as compared to accruals based ones. 
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4.3.1 First Stage Model to Explain the Decision to Manage Earnings 
 Our first stage explains a firm’s decision to manage reported earnings, regardless of 
which method is being used. The literature to date has identified certain managerial 
incentives to manage reported earnings. Recent studies, as reviewed by Fields et al. 
(2001) and Healy and Wahlen (1999), suggest that capital market incentives are the most 
significant ones in affecting earnings management activities. Therefore, we model a 
firm’s decision to engage in earnings management activities as a function these incentives 
as well as equity based compensation, the firm’s capital structure, performance, size and 
growth opportunities. Specifically, we estimate the following model: 
 
Total_EM = β0 + β1HAB_BEAT + β2SHARES + β3ANALYST + β4BONUS + β5OPTION 
β6ROA+ β7MKT_CAPT+ β8B_M + β9LEVERAGE+ + β10∆GDP +ε         (10) 
  
 The dependent variable, Total_EM, is our measure of whether a firm is an earnings 
manager or not. It is defined as taking the value of 1 if the overall earnings management 
score is above the sample median in a given period and 0 otherwise. Recall that both 
abnormal accruals and our real earnings management proxies are regression residuals that 
are reported as a percentage of total assets. Thus, in order to obtain an overall earnings 
management activities score we aggregate a firm’s abnormal accruals and its three real 
earnings management variables (abnormal CFO plus abnormal production costs and 
abnormal discretionary expenses). 
In order to capture the capital market incentives, we include the variables 
HAB_BEAT and SHARES. Bartov et al. (2002) and Kasznik and McNichols (2002) 
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provide evidence suggesting that firms that meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts 
enjoy higher returns. Both Bartov et al. (2002) and Kasznik and McNichols (2002) 
document that this ‘meet/beat’ premium is higher for firms that constantly meet/beat 
analysts’ earnings forecasts, i.e., ‘habitual beaters’. Given this evidence, we conjecture 
that firms that repeatedly meet or beat earnings benchmarks will have stronger incentives 
to manage earnings to keep beating those earnings targets. We include HAB_BEAT, 
defined as the frequency of meeting/beating analysts’ earnings forecasts in the past four 
quarters to capture this specific capital market incentive, and we expect its coefficient to 
be positive.  
Following Barton and Simko (2002) and Zang (2006), we include SHARES, the 
(natural logarithm of) number of shares outstanding. More shares outstanding requires 
more earnings management activities to achieve a given per share earnings target. Since 
this greater threshold may induce greater earnings management to achieve the target 
(Zang, 2006) or discourage earnings management because the target is more difficult to 
achieve (Barton and Simko, 2002), and since it is not clear whether the share effect 
would induce real or accrual earnings management, we make no directional prediction 
about SHARES. 
There are two views advanced in the literature on the role of financial analysts 
who follow the firm and their effect on earnings management activities. On the one hand, 
financial analysts following the firm provide scrutiny and monitoring over firms’ 
activities and thus constrain earnings management activities. On the other hand, analyst 
coverage also provides an incentive to meet or beat their forecasts, which may induce 
earnings management especially towards the end of the fiscal reporting period. Thus, we 
 26
include ANALYST, the degree of analyst coverage (measured as the natural logarithm of 
the number of analysts covering the firm) in our choice model, but we are agnostic as to 
its sign. 
 Recent research suggests that compensation “excesses” are associated with 
earnings management activities.  For example, Coffee (2003), Fuller and Jensen (2002), 
and Greenspan (2002), among others, assert that stock-based compensation and 
managerial ownership increased managers’ incentives to hype earnings and, 
consequently, stock prices, which contributed to the 1990s stock market bubble.9  Given 
the evidence in Cheng and Warfield (2005) and Bergstresser and Philippon (2005), we 
include in our model two variables related to performance-based compensation: 
proportions of bonus compensation and stock-based compensation. BONUS is the 
average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation received by the CEO 
and the CFO of a firm; and OPTION represents the Black-Scholes value of option 
compensation as a proportion of total compensation received by the CEO and the CFO of 
a firm.10 The variables BONUS and OPTION are included to proxy for compensation and 
incentives variables that may induce opportunistic behavior in managers.  We obtain 
compensation data from the EXECUCOMP database which is available only from 1992 
                                                 
9 For instance, Coffee (2003) asserts that the increase in stock-based executive compensation created an 
environment where managers became very sensitive to short-term stock performance. Greenspan (2002) 
opines that “the highly desirable spread of shareholding and options among business managers perversely 
created incentives to artificially inflate earnings to keep stock prices high and rising.”  Fuller and Jensen 
(2002, p. 42) also state that “[a]s stock options became an increasing part of executive compensation, and 
managers who made great fortunes on options became the stuff of legends, the preservation or 
enhancement of short-term stock prices became a personal (and damaging) priority for many CEOs and 
CFOs. High share prices and earnings multiples stoked already amply endowed managerial egos, and 
management teams proved reluctant to undermine their own stature by surrendering hard won records of 
quarter-over-quarter earnings growth.” 
 
10 We also repeat the analyses by measuring BONUS and OPTION variables for the top five executives of a 
firm, and the results are qualitatively unchanged. 
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onwards.  Thus, merging the sample used to test cross-sectional determinants of earnings 
management strategies consists of 1,172 SEO firm observations for the 1992 through 
2006 period.11 
 Finally, to control for capital structure, profitability, size, growth, and economy wide 
conditions we include LEVERAGE (the amount of debt in the firm’s capital structure), 
ROA (return on assets), MKT_CAP (log of market capitalization), B_M (book-to-market 
ratio), and ΔGDP as the change in the GDP as controls. We include these controls given 
the recent reviews of the earnings management literature (e.g., Healy and Whalen, 1999, 
Fields et al. 2001, among others). 
 The results of estimating equation (10) are reported in Table 6, Panel A. The table 
reports both the coefficients and their corresponding Z-statistics, the predicted sign as per 
the discussion above, and the marginal effect on the probability of managing earnings. 
Except for B_M, all of the coefficient estimates are significant, and all have the 
hypothesized sign. Together, they explain over 50% of firms’ decisions to manage 
earnings. In particular, the results show that as predicted, habitually beating earnings 
targets, having many shares outstanding, and having relatively large amounts of bonus 
and option compensation, all positively influence firms’ tendency to manage earnings, 
while having a large analyst following reduces the tendency. The results also confirm the 
importance of managerial and capital market incentives, as HAB_BEAT, BONUS, and 
OPTION all have relatively large marginal effects on the decision to manage earnings. 
 
     
                                                 
11 We have repeated the analysis documented in the previous sections using this reduced sample and the 
results we obtain are similar to those reported in the tables. 
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4.3.2 Second Stage Model to Explain the use of Real versus Accrual Earnings 
Management 
 Given that a firm has decided to manage reported earnings, we now seek to explain its 
choice of accrual versus real earnings management. Based on the widespread belief that 
real earnings management is more costly than accrual-based earnings management (e.g., 
Graham et al. 2005, Gunny 2006, and Zang 2006), and the fact that firms must use real 
management during the quarter but can wait until after the quarter to determine their 
accruals, we assume that firms prefer to use accrual-based earnings management 
activities to meet their reporting objectives. However, if firms are constrained from doing 
so or if the costs are perceived as too high, they substitute to real earnings management 
activities. Based on this assumption, we empirically model an SEO firm’s choice to use 
real or accrual earnings management tools as a function of its ability to use accrual-based 
earnings management and the costs of doing so.  
We represent a firm’s ability to manage earnings using accruals by NOA, the 
firm’s net operating assets position (following Barton and Simko, 2002). Barton and 
Simko argue that since the balance sheet accumulates the effects of prior accounting 
choices, the level of NOA (at least partly) reflects previous earnings management: higher 
current NOA indicating greater past earnings management. Thus, they predict that 
managers’ ability to upwardly manage reported earnings by manipulating accruals is 
negatively related to their firms’ level of NOA. Consistent with their predictions, they 
find that the probability of beating analysts’ earnings expectations is negatively related to 
the level of NOA. Based on their analysis, we predict that an SEO firm’s tendency to use 
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real earnings management is positively related to NOA, since higher NOA firms 
substitute away from accruals-based earnings management. 
The costs of using accrual-based earnings management include the scrutiny 
provided by the capital markets, the potential penalty of detection, and the difficulty of 
achieving a given earnings target. Based on the survey evidence in Graham et al. (2005), 
we assume that firms facing greater scrutiny prefer to use real management. Graham et al. 
find that managers prefer real earnings management to accruals management, because 
real earnings management can be indistinguishable from optimal business decisions, and 
thus more difficult to detect. Avoiding detection is likely to be a stronger motivation the 
greater the scrutiny. Following Gunny (2005) and Zang (2006), we assume that scrutiny 
increases with the presence of a Big 8 auditor, and with the auditor’s experience (tenure) 
at the client. Thus, we include BIG8, a dummy variable for whether a firm has a Big 8 
auditor, and AUDIT-TENURE, the (natural logarithm of) the number years the auditor has 
audited the firm. We predict that the tendency for SEO firms to use real earnings 
management is positively related to both BIG8 and AUDIT_TENURE.  
The primary penalty for earnings manipulation is litigation. Since accrual-based 
manipulation is more likely than real activities manipulation to be detected and therefore 
punished, greater perceived litigation penalties should increase the tendency for real 
earnings management. To capture expected litigation penalties, we include two dummy 
variables. The first, LITIGATION, equals one if a firm is in a high litigation industry, and 
zero otherwise. Following Barton and Simko (2002) and Zang (2006), high litigation 
industries are SIC codes 2833-2836, 8731-8734, 7371-7379, 3570-3577, and 3600-3674. 
These SIC codes correspond, respectively, to the following industries: 
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pharmaceuticals/biotechnology, computers, and electronics. The second, SOX, based on 
our findings in Section 4.2 above, equals one if the SEO observation falls within the Post-
SOX period and zero in the Pre-SOX period. We predict that the tendency for SEO firms 
to use real earnings management is positively related to both LITIGATION and SOX.  
Thus, our model of SEO firms’ real earnings management choices is: 
 
Real Earnings Management = β0 + β1BIG8 + β2AUDIT_TENURE + β3LITIGATION + 
β4NOA + β5SOX + β6INVS_MILLS + ε                      (11) 
  
 We estimate equation (11) as a Probit model, to account for SEO firms’ differing 
preference of real over accrual earnings management, with the dependent variable 
defined as follows:  
 1 if a firm’s real earnings management proxy > the sample median real earnings 
management proxy and 0 otherwise. 
  The structure of our Probit model is such that a factor that is hypothesized to 
increase the tendency for real earnings management it is expected to have a positive 
coefficient. Thus, BIG8, AUDIT_TENURE, LITIGATION, NOA, and SOX are all 
expected to have positive coefficients.  
 The results of estimating equation (11) are reported in Table 6, Panel B. Analogous to 
Panel A, the table reports both the coefficients and their corresponding Z-statistics, the 
predicted sign as per the discussion above, and the marginal effect on the probability of 
the firm using real earnings management.. Thus, for example, having a Big 8 auditor 
increases the probability by about 7%. As hypothesized, we find that the presence of a 
 31
Big 8 auditor, auditor tenure, being in a high litigation industry, the level of net operating 
assets, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are all associated with an increased tendency to use 
real earnings management around the time of the SEO. The greatest marginal effect on 
using real earnings management comes from the firm’s NOA position and SOX, 
supporting the evidence in Barton and Simko (2002) and Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2007), 
respectively. Overall, the model is highly significant, and explains about 68% of SEO 
firms’ real earnings management decisions.  
 In summary, the two-stage model is highly effective in explaining both firms’ 
decisions to manage earnings, and, given that they do so, whether they use real or 
accrual-based earnings management. We emphasize that although we use our model to 
study SEOs, the model could be used more generally to study how firms tradeoff between 
the two methods of earnings management, an important topic for future research.  
 
5. Conclusion 
We examine earnings management behavior around SEOs, by focusing on both 
real activities and accrual-based manipulation, and how this behavior varies over time 
and cross-sectionally. Although research has addressed the issues of earnings 
management around SEOs and earnings management via real activities manipulation, 
ours is the first paper to put these two issues together. To capture accruals-based earnings 
management we use the modified cross-sectional Jones model (Jones 1991) as described 
in Dechow et al. (1995). To capture real earnings management activities, we follow 
Roychowdhury (2006) and estimate abnormal levels of cash flows from operations, 
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discretionary expenses (the sum of advertising, R&D, and SG&A), and production costs. 
We make three contributions to the literature.  
First, we document that firms use real, as well as accrual-based, earnings 
management tools around SEOs. Second, consistent with the expectation that SOX has 
made accrual-based earnings management more costly, we find that firms have 
substituted from accrual to real earnings management after SOX. Finally, we show how 
the tendency for firms to tradeoff real versus accrual-based earnings management 
activities around SEO’s varies cross-sectionally. We find that firms’ choices vary 
predictably as a function of the firm’s ability to use accrual management and the costs of 
doing so. Our model is a first step in examining how firms tradeoff between real versus 
accrual methods of earnings management. This remains an important topic for future 
research.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for sample firms conducting SEOs during 1987-2006. 
 
Panel A: Size characteristics  
 Total Assets
($ mil.) 
Market 
Value  
($ mil.) 
Book-to-
Market 
Offer 
Amount 
($ mil.) 
Offer 
Size 
Mean 422.10 543.87 0.43 85.64 0.28 
Median 118.62 186.29 0.34 52.90 0.23 
Std. Dev. 913.23 1704.72 0.41 172.18 0.24 
 
Panel B: Time distribution 
Year Freq % Cum. % 
1987 86 5.69% 5.69% 
1988 49 3.24% 8.93% 
1989 59 3.90% 12.84% 
1990 42 2.78% 15.62% 
1991 103 6.82% 22.44% 
1992 112 7.41% 29.85% 
1993 105 6.95% 36.80% 
1994 89 5.89% 42.69% 
1995 107 7.08% 49.77% 
1996 114 7.54% 57.31% 
1997 80 5.29% 62.61% 
1998 74 4.90% 67.50% 
1999 95 6.29% 73.79% 
2000 58 3.84% 77.63% 
2001 72 4.77% 82.40% 
2002 83 5.49% 87.89% 
2003 64 4.24% 92.12% 
2004 54 3.57% 95.70% 
2005 43 2.85% 98.54% 
2006 22 1.46% 100.00% 
Total 1,511 100 %  
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Panel C: Industry (SIC) distribution 
Industry Two-digit SIC 
codes 
Freq % 
Oil and Gas 13, 29 82 5.41 
Food products 20 19 1.25 
Paper and paper products 24-27 49 3.17 
Chemical products 28 139 9.24 
Manufacturing 30-34 55 3.65 
Computer equipment and 
services 
35, 73 200 13.25 
Electronic equipment 36 144 9.57 
Transportation 37, 39, 40-42, 44,45 63 4.17 
Scientific instruments 38 99 6.54 
Communications 48 32 2.15 
Electric, gas, and sanitary 
services 
49 158 10.49 
Durable goods 50 53 3.43 
Retail 53, 54, 56, 57, 59 59 3.94 
Eating and drinking 
establishments 
58 22 1.47 
Entertainment services 70, 78, 79 32 2.07 
Health 80 33 2.16 
All others  272 18.04 
Total  1,511 100 % 
 
Notes to Table 1: Total assets are beginning of period total assets (Compustat data item #6);  Market value 
refers to market value of equity and is calculated as the closing price at fiscal year-end times the number of 
shares outstanding at fiscal year-end (Compustat annual data item #199 times Compustat annual data item 
#25); Book-to-Market ratio, where the book value of common equity (Compustat annual data item #60) is 
divided by market value of equity (calculated as the closing price at fiscal year-end times the number of 
shares outstanding at fiscal year-end (Compustat annual data item #199 times Compustat annual data item 
#25)); Offer amount is the dollar amount of the seasoned equity offering; Offering Size is computed as the 
number of shares offered divided by the number of shares outstanding before the seasoned equity offering. 
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Table 2. Accrual-based and Real Earnings Management Proxies around Seasoned Equity Offerings  
 
Year -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
        
Discretionary accruals -0.010 
(-0.86) 
0.001 
(0.98) 
0.008 
(1.12) 
0.0153 
(3.63)*** 
0.009 
(1.79)* 
-0.004 
(-1.01) 
-0.007 
(-1.82)* 
Abnormal cash flows 
from operations 
-0.003 
(-0.09) 
-0.017 
(-1.79)* 
-0.025 
(-2.14)* 
-0.046 
(-5.89)*** 
-0.031 
(2.58)*** 
-0.017 
(-1.74)* 
-0.001 
(-0.31) 
Abnormal production 
costs 
-0.004 
(-0.68) 
-0.009 
(-0.86) 
-0.011 
(-1.41) 
0.043 
(4.96)*** 
-0.005 
(-1.09) 
-0.014 
(-1.04) 
-0.007 
(-0.54) 
Abnormal discretionary 
expenses 
-0.008 
(2.14)** 
-0.004 
(-1.97)* 
-0.001 
(-1.39) 
-0.004 
(-2.09)** 
0.001 
(2.46)** 
0.003 
(1.61) 
-0.001 
(-0.97) 
R_M Proxy 0.004 
(0.97) 
 
0.006 
(1.62)* 
0.017 
(2.36)** 
0.057 
(4.06)*** 
0.007 
(1.86)* 
0.003 
(0.67) 
0.001 
(0.37) 
Notes to Table 3: This table reports time series of accrual-based and real earnings management proxies from year -3 to year +3 relative to the seasoned equity 
offering (year 0). Discretionary accruals are estimated using the modified Jones Model; Abnormal cash from operations are estimated as the deviations from the 
predicted values from the following industry-year regression: 
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; CFO are cash flow from operations 
(Compustat data item 308 -Compustat data item 124; Sales are annual sales revenues (Compustat data item 12) and Assets are total assets (Compustat data item 
6);  Abnormal production costs are estimated as the deviations from the predicted values from the following industry-year regression: 
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)(1 ; PROD are production costs defined as the sum of costs of goods sold 
(Compustat data item 41) and change in inventory during the year (Compustat data item 3); Abnormal discretionary expenses are estimated as the deviations 
from the predicted values from the following industry-year regression: , 1
1 2
, 1 , 1 , 1
1 i ti t
t i t
i t i t i t
S a l e sD i s c E x p k k
A s s e t s A s s e t s A s s e t s
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= + + ; DISCEXP are discretionary expenses 
during the year and are defined as the sum of as the sum of advertising expenses (Compustat data item 45), R&D expenses (Compustat data item 46) and SG&A 
(Compustat data item 189). R_M Proxy is the sum of abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses.  We 
multiply abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses by negative one such that the sum of the three variables will be indicative of 
overall real earnings management.
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Table 3. Correlation Matrix among Earnings Management Proxies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% 
Notes to Table 2: This table reports Pearson (above the diagonal) and Spearman (below the diagonal) correlation for the sample of seasoned equity firms over 
1987-2006.  
DA are discretionary accruals computed using the Modified Jones model; R_CFO represents the level of abnormal cash flows from operations; R_PROD 
represents the level of abnormal production costs, where production costs are defined as the sum of cost of goods sold and the change in inventories; R_DISX 
represents the level of abnormal discretionary expenses, where discretionary expenses are the sum of advertising expenses (annual Compustat data item 45), 
R&D expenses (annual Compustat data item 46) and SG&A expenses (annual Compustat data 189). 
 
 
 DA R_CFO R_PROD R_DISX 
DA 1 -0.252*** 0.031*** -0.179*** 
R_CFO -0.228*** 1 -0.282*** -0.165*** 
R_PROD 0.029*** -0.189*** 1 -0.276*** 
R_DISX -0.152*** -0.233*** -0.198*** 1 
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Table 4. Performance around Seasoned Equity Offerings  
 
Panel A: Return on Assets performance  
Year -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
        
Industry Adjusted ROA 0.009 
(1.98)* 
0.012 
(2.12)** 
0.023 
(3.49)*** 
0.031 
(5.97)*** 
-0.014 
(3.67)*** 
-0.013 
(-2.83)*** 
-0.009 
(-1.85)* 
        
Industry Adjusted ∆ROA  -0.000 
(-0.02) 
0.002 
(0.96) 
0.019 
(5.41)*** 
-0.017 
(4.16)*** 
-0.009 
(2.59)*** 
-0.002 
(-1.89)* 
 
Panel B: Return on Assets performance, for the extreme quartile of discretionary accruals 
Year -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
        
Industry Adjusted ROA 0.008 
(1.76)* 
0.018 
(2.67)*** 
0.028 
(3.48)*** 
0.036 
(6.05)*** 
-0.023 
(-3.48)*** 
-0.017 
(-2.95)*** 
-0.008 
(-1.82)* 
        
Industry Adjusted ∆ROA  0.006 
(1.42) 
0.003 
(0.62) 
0.009 
(2.94)*** 
-0.022 
(-4.09)*** 
-0.012 
(-3.64)*** 
-0.008 
(-1.99)* 
 
Panel C: Return on Assets performance, for the extreme quartile of abnormal cash flow from operations 
Year -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
        
Industry Adjusted ROA 0.006 
(1.06) 
0.013 
(1.99)* 
0.018 
(3.03)*** 
0.037 
(4.19)*** 
-0.021 
(-3.16)*** 
-0.019 
(-2.87)*** 
-0.007 
(-1.24) 
        
Industry Adjusted ∆ROA  0.004 
(0.98) 
0.008 
(1.08) 
0.011 
(3.07)*** 
-0.024 
(-4.09)*** 
-0.017 
(2.69)** 
-0.006 
(-1.79)* 
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Panel D: Return on Assets performance, for the extreme quartile of abnormal production costs 
Year -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
        
Industry Adjusted ROA 0.008 
(1.09) 
0.011 
(1.43) 
0.018 
(2.07)** 
0.027 
(4.26)*** 
-0.035 
(-4.69)*** 
-0.027 
(-3.69)*** 
-0.019 
(-3.89)*** 
        
Industry Adjusted ∆ROA  0.002 
(0.54) 
0.003 
(1.09) 
0.021 
(3.57)*** 
-0.037 
(-4.62)*** 
-0.012 
(-3.18)*** 
-0.007 
(-1.63)* 
 
Panel E: Return on Assets performance, for the extreme quartile of abnormal discretionary expenses 
Year -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
        
Industry Adjusted ROA 0.005 
(0.96) 
0.006 
(1.04) 
0.012 
(2.83)** 
0.019 
(2.96)*** 
-0.017 
(-3.09)*** 
-0.013 
(-4.06)*** 
-0.018 
(-3.46)*** 
        
Industry Adjusted ∆ROA  0.002 
(0.74) 
0.004 
(1.26) 
0.024 
(3.97)*** 
-0.027 
(-4.68)*** 
-0.018 
(-3.47)*** 
-0.007 
(-1.85)* 
 
Panel F: Return on Assets performance, for the extreme quartile of overall real earnings Management Activities (R_M Proxy) 
Year -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
        
Industry Adjusted ROA 0.005 
(0.67) 
0.008 
(0.96) 
0.015 
(2.97)*** 
0.019 
(3.06)*** 
-0.021 
(-3.91)*** 
-0.017 
(-2.84)*** 
-0.011 
(-3.46)*** 
        
Industry Adjusted ∆ROA  0.001 
(0.62) 
0.003 
(1.31) 
0.017 
(3.23)*** 
-0.029 
(-3.91)*** 
-0.013 
(-2.94)*** 
-0.004 
(1.74)* 
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Notes to Table 4: This table  
 
IND_ROA is the industry adjusted return on assets, where the return on assets  is defined as income before extraordinary items divided by beginning of period 
total assets less the industry median; Discretionary accruals are estimated using the modified Jones Model; Abnormal cash from operations are estimated as the 
deviations from the predicted values from the following industry-year regression: 
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; CFO are cash flow from 
operations (Compustat data item 308 -Compustat data item 124; Sales are annual sales revenues (Compustat data item 12) and Assets are total assets (Compustat 
data item 6);  Abnormal production costs are estimated as the deviations from the predicted values from the following industry-year regression: 
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)(1 ; PROD are production costs defined as the sum of costs of goods sold 
(Compustat data item 41) and change in inventory during the year (Compustat data item 3); Abnormal discretionary expenses are estimated as the deviations 
from the predicted values from the following industry-year regression: , 1
1 2
, 1 , 1 , 1
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= + + ; DISCEXP are discretionary expenses 
during the year and are defined as the sum of as the sum of advertising expenses (Compustat data item 45), R&D expenses (Compustat data item 46) and SG&A 
(Compustat data item 189). R_M Proxy is the sum of abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses.  We 
multiply abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses by negative one such that the sum of the three variables will be indicative of 
overall real earnings management. 
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Table 5. The Sarbanes Oxley Act and Accrual-based and Real Earnings Management proxies in the Year of Seasoned Equity 
Offering 
 
 Prior to SOX (1) 
1998-2001 
After Sox (2) 
2003-2006 
Difference (2) – (1) 
    
Discretionary accruals 0.047 
(6.98)*** 
0.013 
(4.23)*** 
-0.034 
(-8.54)*** 
    
Abnormal cash flows 
from operations 
-0.032 
(-4.32)*** 
 
-0.009 
(-1.97)* 
0.021 
(4.19)*** 
    
Abnormal production 
costs 
-0.032 
(-3.09)*** 
0.021 
(4.21)*** 
0.043 
(3.95)*** 
    
Abnormal discretionary 
expenses 
-0.008 
(-1.87)* 
-0.013 
(-2.49)** 
-0.005 
(1.07) 
    
R_M Proxy 0.019 
(3.27)**** 
0.033 
(4.67)*** 
0.014 
(3.09)*** 
    
No. of SEOs 299 183 116 
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Notes to Table 5:  
This table reports properties of accrual-based and real earnings management in the year of the seasoned equity offering (year 0) prior to SOX and post-SOX. 
Seasoned equity offerings occurring prior to 2002 are classified as PRIOR to SOX and seasoned equity offerings occurring after 2003 are classified as AFTER 
SOX. Discretionary accruals are estimated using the modified Jones Model; Abnormal cash from operations are estimated as the deviations from the predicted 
values from the following industry-year regression: 
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; CFO are cash flow from operations (Compustat data 
item 308 -Compustat data item 124; Sales are annual sales revenues (Compustat data item 12) and Assets are total assets (Compustat data item 6);  Abnormal 
production costs are estimated as the deviations from the predicted values from the following industry-year regression: 
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)(1 ; PROD are production costs defined as the sum of costs of goods sold 
(Compustat data item 41) and change in inventory during the year (Compustat data item 3); Abnormal discretionary expenses are estimated as the deviations 
from the predicted values from the following industry-year regression: , 1
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= + + ; DISCEXP are discretionary expenses 
during the year and are defined as the sum of as the sum of advertising expenses (Compustat data item 45), R&D expenses (Compustat data item 46) and SG&A 
(Compustat data item 189). R_M Proxy is the sum of abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses.  We 
multiply abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses by negative one such that the sum of the three variables will be indicative of 
overall real earnings management. 
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Table 6: Cross-sectional determinants of earnings management strategies in the 
year of the SEO 
 
Panel A: Determinants of Overall Earnings Management Activities (First Stage) 
 
 Predicted Sign 
Coeff. 
(Z- Statistic) 
Marginal Effect 
(%) 
    
HAB_BEAT + 
0.043 
(5.67)*** 18.09 
SHARES + 
0.067 
(4.39)*** 9.47 
ANALYST -/+ 
-0.005 
(-3.67)*** 6.12 
BONUS + 
0.027 
(3.08)*** 11.32 
OPTION + 
0.074 
(4.03)*** 16.32 
ROA ? 
0.034 
(2.76)** 5.32 
MKT_CAP ? 
0.001 
(1.99)** 2.67 
B_M ? 
-0.002 
(1.09) 2.74 
LEVERAGE ? 
0.004 
(2.08)** 4.97 
∆GDP ? 
0.001 
(1.67)* 2.09 
    
No. of Observations 1,172   
    
Likelihood ratio χ2 421.67   
Maximum Likelihood R2 0.581   
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Panel B: Determinants of Real Earnings Management Activities (Second Stage) 
 
 Predicted Sign 
Coeff. 
(Z- Statistic) 
Marginal Effect 
(%) 
    
BIG8 + 
0.031 
(3.09)*** 7.39 
AUDIT_TENURE +/- 
0.003 
(1.69)* 6.07 
LITIGATION + 
0.024 
(4.51)*** 6.12 
NOA + 
0.033 
(5.74)*** 14.69 
SOX + 
0.006 
(3.79)*** 15.96 
Inverse Mills Ratio ? 
0.167 
(3.09)***  
    
No. of Observations 1,172   
 
   
Likelihood ratio χ2 391.35   
Maximum Likelihood R2 0.684   
 
 
Notes to table 6: This table presents the results of two Probit models. Marginal effects are computed as: β* 
X(π *[1- X(π ], where )1()( '' XX eeX ββπ += and β’X is evaluated at the mean values of X. For 
every observation we add discretionary accruals and the overall real earnings management proxy (R_M 
Proxy) to obtain an overall measure of earnings management, TOTAL_EM. For Panel A, the dependent 
variable takes the value of 1 if the overall earnings management score is above the sample median earnings 
management score. If TOTAL_EM is lower than the median, the dependent variable for this observation 
takes the value of 0. For Panel B, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 R_M Proxy is higher than the 
sample median R_M Proxy. HAB_BEAT SHARES is the weighted average number of common shares 
outstanding at the beginning of the year, prior to the SEO; ANALYST is the number of analysts following 
the firm. BONUS is the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation received by the 
CEO and the CFO of a firm; OPTION represents the Black-Scholes value of option compensation as a 
proportion of total compensation received by the CEO and the CFO of a firm; ROA is return on assets and 
is defined as income before extraordinary items divided by beginning of period total assets; MKT_CAP is 
market value of equity and is calculated as the closing price at fiscal year-end times the number of shares 
outstanding at fiscal year-end;  
B_M is the Book-to-Market ratio, where the book value of common equity s divided by market value of 
equity;
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LEVERAGE is the sum of short term and long term debt divided by average total assets; ∆GDP is the 
seasonal annual change in GDP; BIG8 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm’s auditor belongs to the 
Big 8 auditors and 0 otherwise; AUDIT_TENURE is the log of the number of years the auditor has been 
with the firm; LITIGATION is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm’s SIC code is 2833-2836, 8731-
8734, 7371-7379, 3570-3577, 3600-3674 and zero otherwise; NOA is net operating assets which is 
calculated as the sum of shareholders’ equity less cash and marketable securities and plus total debt at the 
beginning of the year, deflated by total sales for the previous year;  
SOX is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the observation is after 2003
